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doctrinal categories in pursuit of sound principles of justice must involve this sort of more theoretical inquiry as well as ordinary analogical reasoning.
This general understanding of doctrinal categories draws on the dynamic and unsettled character of the common law. No doubt one should not exaggerate this aspect of the law. Generally, the common law can be satisfactorily treated simply as a body of fixed rules to be identified and applied to the facts. One could reasonably object that the law would not be performing its normal function if this were not the case. 10 Insofar as the common law is understood in this way, doctrinal categories indeed serve only to assist in the exposition of the law. They have only a labelling function. Doctrinal categories on this view are inert, one might say, and at least for practical purposes there is no point in disputing the characterisation of a claim: the only sensible approach on this view is to follow whichever conventional usage has become established. This understanding of doctrinal categories is also familiar, and, as I mentioned, it accounts for the widely held view that the controversy over the development of a law of restitution or unjust enrichment was futile and misplaced. But this approach provides only a limited understanding of doctrinal categories, and it does not explain the particular problems that are in issue here, the soundness of a new doctrinal category, the role of a doctrinal category in decisions and in developing the law, and controversy about whether particular claims should be treated as falling within a certain category or not.
WAS IT RIGHT TO ADOPT A DOCTRINAL CATEGORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT?
The modern development of a doctrinal category of unjust enrichment is, on the face of it, consistent with the analysis above. It appears that analogous doctrinal fragments have been brought together under a common framework to establish a new doctrinal category. To some, justificatory principle, but a "descriptive" or "organising" principle, or to the same effect, it seems, a unifying concept rather than a principle. 17 The idea seems to be that the principle or concept is not relevant to justifying claims in the category or determining when they are available; it is merely a useful way of arranging the material for the purposes of analysis. But in what way is it useful? According to Burrows, 18 this way of arranging the material is apt for analysis because it brings together cases that are relevantly similar and separates out cases that are relevantly dissimilar. If this is the case, however, it seems that the principle must be a principle of liability, since the similarity and dissimilarity of cases must presumably be concerned with whether they share the features that are relevant to liability. More generally, if the category is not a justificatory category, there is no justification for the way it is . 18 Burrows, supra note 1, 4. 19 In recent years, the concern has been with whether the established "unjust factors" approach is preferable to the "absence of basis" approach: see, e.g., Burrows, supra note 1, ch 5. To my way of thinking, this is a distraction from the fundamental issue of identifying a principle of liability. It might be argued that the category of unjust enrichment is like the doctrinal category of tort, and tort, it might reasonably be said, is not a doctrinal category based on a single principle of liability, but a collection of different types of claim based on different principles of liability. Possibly this is the implication of the "unjust factors" approach. See, for example, the discussion in SA Smith, "Unjust Enrichment: Nearer to Tort than Contract" in Chambers et al, supra note 1. This may well be the right way to understand tort law, but if so tort law as a whole is not a doctrinal category in the particular sense I have suggested above. The doctrinal categories would be the particular torts, such as negligence, defamation, etc.
principle of liability but a type of remedy. This is, of course, consistent with the fact that what is now commonly described as the law of unjust enrichment was until recently described as the law of restitution, and developed to address the problem of explaining various types of claim that had a certain remedy in common, namely restitution, understood as the remedy of undoing a transfer, or requiring payment for a benefit. 20 If it is the type of remedy that characterises the law of unjust enrichment, and not a justifying principle, it is a mistake to recognise it as a doctrinal category, just as it would be a mistake, say, to unify contract and negligence on the ground that they generally involve the same remedy of compensation. This objection gains support from the way in which the principle of unjust enrichment is often expressed, as the principle that unjust enrichments should be reversed or undone. 21 This is not a principle of liability, since it does not bear on whether an enrichment is unjust or not; it holds that if an enrichment is unjust there should be a remedy to undo it. Furthermore, the standard unjust enrichment analysis of a claim is by reference to the three-stage framework, which requires that (1) there is a benefit to D, (2) the benefit is at C's expense, and (3) there is an "unjust factor". This formulation is quite consistent with the possibility that the category is really a remedial category, just as one could bring together claims for compensation for loss and then classify them according to "unjust factors" such as "failure to act as agreed" or "failure to exercise reasonable care". This I will refer to as the "remedy-as-justification" fallacy, the fallacy of treating a remedial category as if it were a justificatory category.
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No doubt it is possible in the common law for the courts to develop a new, sound doctrinal category by bringing together various parts of the law without being able to discern or articulate fully the principle of liability that justifies the development. But if the new category is indeed a sound category based on a genuine principle of liability, one would expect to see some assimilation of the different doctrinal fragments so that in due course their 20 It might be better to say that there is a group of benefit-based remedies. 21 e.g., Burrows, supra note 1, 3. 22 See Jaffey, supra note 3, 17.
separate origins become obscured or even entirely concealed, and it seems to me doubtful whether this is happening to any degree in the case of unjust enrichment. Although it has become customary to recite a standard unjust enrichment framework, it seems to me that on the whole the strands of authority have remained separate. Furthermore, one would expect the development to be productive in resolving or at least casting light on some existing problems through the new insights or comparisons that it generates. But, again, it seems to me doubtful whether any problems have been solved through the application of a principle of unjust enrichment or the development of a doctrinal category of unjust enrichment.
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If there is in fact no principle of unjust enrichment, the recognition of the doctrinal category is a source of incoherence and obscurity and confusion in the law. It brings together
for common treatment cases that should be treated separately and it separates out for different treatment cases that should be treated in the same way. It obscures the real issues and obstructs the development of the law according to sound principles.
The reason why the category of unjust enrichment has been so beguiling is not, it seems to me, the appeal of the principle of unjust enrichment or its success in illuminating and solving problems in the law. It is because it seems impossible to explain the longestablished claims for restitutionary remedies that arise in connection with the nonperformance of a contract or with transfers of property (the majority of claims for restitutionary remedies) as claims arising in contract law or property law, according to the conventional understanding of these areas. 24 The issue here is the relationship between primary and remedial relations.
23 I am not suggesting that the literature does not contain valuable and useful contributions to our understanding, but that these do not arise from the elucidation or application of a principle of unjust enrichment or from the recognition of the doctrinal category or the reorganisation of material involved in this. 24 Not all claims that are said to be unjust enrichment claims can be explained in terms of property or contract, and this is sometimes said to be a point in the favour of the theory of unjust enrichment: see Lionel Smith, "Unjust Enrichment, Property, and the Structure of Trusts" (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 412, 419. In the end everything turns on what principle of liability is offered.
REMEDIES AND THE VINDICATION OF PRIMARY RIGHTS
In a typical case in private law, according to the usual understanding, C's claim arises from the breach by D of a duty owed to C. What should the legal consequences be? It is helpful to distinguish between two sorts of legal consequences. First, there is a sanction or penalty. I take a sanction or penalty to be a measure imposed as a matter of public interest to deter or punish the breach of duty, and I will leave this type of measure aside. 25 Secondly, there is a remedy, in the strict sense, which protects the interest of the particular claimant and corrects the injustice done to him. 26 The appropriate remedy to achieve this follows from the content of duty breached. The rationale for the remedy is to secure to C the benefit of the duty he was owed. This is achieved by ordering D to perform the original duty, or to provide some equivalent performance, or to pay C compensation measured by what the performance of the duty was worth to C. Sometimes, after the breach, it is impossible to secure the performance of the original duty, as in many cases of injury or damage, and even if it is possible one might say that sometimes it is unfairly burdensome to D to require it, and C should be limited to compensation. But, subject to this point, one can say that the remedy should protect C's right by securing to him the benefit of the right, or in other words the benefit of the performance of the duty owed to him. This I will refer to as vindicating the right. 27 It is convenient to distinguish between primary and remedial relations in the following way. The primary relation is the duty D has, and C's correlative right, in the first place, which determines what constitutes a breach of duty and so when a claim arises, and the remedial relation is C's right to a remedy and D's correlative duty or liability to provide it, which arises from the breach of duty and serves to vindicate the primary relation.
According to the pattern assumed above, the primary relation is a right-duty relation, requiring D to act or not to act in a certain way. But this need not be the case. The injustice that a primary relation specifies and a claim in private law corrects should not necessarily be understood as a breach of duty and its consequences. Sometimes the primary relation should be understood simply as an allocation of prospective benefits or harms, so that D bears responsibility for a specified risk or contingency vis-à-vis C, and if the contingency materialises a claim arises for C against D. The injustice consists of the state of affairs following the materialisation of the contingency, and the appropriate remedy to vindicate the primary right is to secure the proper allocation of the benefit or harm in question. The injustice does not involve a breach of duty and the remedy does not correct a breach of duty.
For example, some commentators take the view that a claim in negligence arises from a loss caused by the defendant's conduct having fallen below a specified standard of conduct, without any requirement that this constituted a breach of duty by D. The law simply imposes responsibility for this loss on D rather than C, without necessarily imposing a duty on D not to act in this way or not to cause loss in this way. On this view, although it is conventional to say that the claim arises from a breach of the duty of care, the supposed duty is just a way of defining the contingency for which D is responsible. I give this example by way of illustration, and it is not necessary for present purposes to consider whether this is the right way of understanding negligence. If the appropriate remedy follows directly from the primary right, to vindicate it, the primary relation and the remedial relation are based on and together give effect to the same principle of liability and should be treated together as parts of the same doctrinal category.
The category encompasses the rules determining the primary relation and the rules governing its vindication in various circumstances by the remedial relation. This is the usual understanding in contract law, which is understood to encompass the rules governing the primary relation -usually understood as the duty to perform the contract and the correlative right to receive performance -and also the rules governing the remedial relation -the right to specific performance or compensation that arises from a breach of contract. Similarly the category of negligence encompasses the duty of care and the right to compensation that arises from a breach of the duty.
RESTITUTION IN CONTRACT LAW
On the standard analysis of contract law, the primary relation consists of a duty to perform and a right to receive performance, and the appropriate remedy is specific performance or expectation damages, which vindicate the primary relation. One might say, on this view, that contract law generates only an "expectation interest" or "performance interest". 28 Consider reliance damages, by contrast. Reliance damages are not, on the face of it, apt to vindicate the primary right, because they do not serve to correct the wrong by giving C the benefit of the 29 There is no right to protection for reliance loss as such, or in other words, no distinct "reliance interest" under the contract.
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Sometimes C is allowed to recover a payment made under the contract, or is given a quantum meruit for goods or services supplied under the contract. 31 These are commonly described as restitutionary remedies, and again it appears that, as for reliance damages, a claim for a restitutionary remedy cannot be understood to arise from the contract, because the restitutionary remedy does not vindicate the primary right to receive performance: it does not correct the wrong of non-performance by fulfilling or giving effect to the primary right to performance. Under the standard analysis, there is no contractual "restitution interest", any more than there is a contractual reliance interest. Furthermore, a restitutionary remedy cannot be understood as a proxy for the expectation measure. The measure of recovery is allowed to exceed the expectation measure, and moreover there can be a claim where D clearly has not committed a breach of his duty of performance, for example on frustration or where it was C who breached the contract. Thus if a claim for a restitutionary remedy should sometimes be available in the contractual context, as for example where C has paid in advance and D has done nothing in return, it seems that it must be a claim arising by virtue of some other principle of liability, in some other doctrinal category. This is taken to be unjust enrichment, and the restitutionary remedy is understood as a remedy that serves to remove a benefit from D or require D to pay for a benefit. 32 This seems to be the main reason why the claim is understood to be an unjust enrichment claim, though obviously it falls short of providing a The usual unjust enrichment analysis of the claim for a restitutionary remedy in the contractual context does not explicitly state a principle of liability. It specifies an unjust factor, which is said to be "failure of basis" or "failure of condition". 34 It is said that C performs the contract on the basis that D will provide reciprocal performance, and that if D does not do so C can recover his performance because the basis on which it was provided has failed. The restitutionary remedy is understood as the return of the contractual performance.
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But in fact the basis on which the parties perform is the agreement -it is the function of the agreement to determine the basis on which the parties perform. According to the standard analysis, the parties perform on the basis that the other party has a reciprocal duty of performance, and the appropriate remedy, if the reciprocal performance is not provided, is specific performance or expectation damages to vindicate the right to performance and the duty to provide it. No doubt C and D could agree that performance is to be returned if there is no reciprocal performance, and then a restitutionary remedy would vindicate the primary right and the claim would be contractual. But otherwise it is inconsistent to say that the parties make a contract, understood in accordance with the standard analysis, and also that they contract on the basis that performance is returnable if the agreed reciprocal performance is not provided. 33 One might argue that the role of unjust enrichment is to extend the protection given to contractual rights by providing additional remedies on contractual termination that contract law does not. On this view, one might say that unjust enrichment is a remedial doctrinal category, concerning with determining when a particular remedy is appropriate to provide extra protection for a primary right arising in another doctrinal category, such as contract. I understand this to be Friedmann's approach: see e.g. Daniel Friedmann, "The Creation of Entitlements through the Law of Restitution", in Rickett & Grantham, supra note 8, 185. But if we accept the approach adopted above, the appropriate remedies to protect a primary right are a matter of what is necessary to vindicate it, and this is an aspect of the law of contract. 34 e.g., Burrows, supra note 1, 319. 35 This way of putting it characterises contractual performance as a transfer, which is apt in my view only for transfers of money or property: see infra at note 61. On what basis do the parties actually perform? That is to say, how should we understand the agreement and its legal effect? It seems reasonable to ask whether there is a way of understanding an agreement -a possible basis for contracting -that explains the availability of the various remedies that can arise out of a contract, including expectation damages, specific performance, and also the restitutionary remedies, as being in each case the appropriate remedy to vindicate the agreement in the particular circumstances in which it is available. This brings into consideration another longstanding puzzle concerning contract remedies. If a contracting party has a duty to perform, as the standard analysis holds, why is it that a contracting party who has failed to perform is not in the usual case ordered to do so, even when performance has not become any more burdensome as a result of the breach; and why is he not in any other way treated as having acted wrongfully, for example by being required to disgorge the profits of breach? Under the standard analysis, this seems to be a clear failure of vindication.
It seems to me that there a way of understanding an agreement that can explain the remedial regime in contract, as I have argued elsewhere. 36 On this approach, a contracting party is understood to proceed on the basis that the contract protects his contractual reliance interest, the interest in being compensated or paid for what he has done so far under the contract. The agreement between contracting parties involves each party accepting responsibility for the other party's reliance on the assumption that the contract will proceed as specified, rather than undertaking to perform. On this understanding, a contracting party should be entitled to a restitutionary remedy, to return money he has paid or provide payment for what he has done under the contract. In my view, insofar as restitutionary remedies are rightly awarded as a remedy in the event of non-performance of a contract, it is because the agreement is along these lines. One might object that on this account expectation damages cannot be justified, since expectation damages are normally understood to be justified only because they serve to correct a breach of the duty to perform the contract and on this account there is normally no duty to perform the contract. But, as has often been pointed out, the suggested account can explain the availability of expectation damages as a proxy for reliance loss, including opportunity cost, in the generality of cases. It can also explain why it is that specific performance is not generally available, since in the ordinary case there is no duty to perform.
Whether or not this suggested contractual approach is accepted, it at least demonstrates the possibility of a contractual analysis of restitutionary remedies in contract.
On a contractual analysis, the injustice that a claim for a restitutionary remedy corrects is a contractual injustice, an injustice relative to the primary relation generated by the agreement.
On the suggested approach, the primary relation is not in general a right-duty relation: it follows the alternative pattern mentioned above according to which it amounts to an 36 Jaffey, supra note 12, ch 2 and Peter Jaffey, "Restitutionary Remedies in the Contractual Context" (2013) 76 Modern Law Review (forthcoming).
allocation of prospective benefits or losses. Maybe a different contractual account is available which shows in a different way how a restitutionary remedy can vindicate an agreement. By contrast, it seems to me that the unjust enrichment approach has not managed to find any distinct non-contractual account of restitutionary remedies arising from the non-performance of a contract. This tends to support the idea that the unjust enrichment approach involves a version of the "remedy-as-justification" fallacy. Starting from the position that a claim for a restitutionary remedy is apt in certain circumstances in the contractual context, and on the assumption that it cannot have a contractual basis, it is inferred that there must be some other justification for a claim for such a remedy, which is taken to be the principle of unjust enrichment, though the principle is not actually spelt out, or when it is spelt out it appears to be a disguised form of the contractual principle.
RESTITUTION IN PROPERTY LAW
The same problem in property law
The same fallacy has affected the law of private property. Some would say that only a tangible thing can be an "object of property", 37 but I will assume (I will come back to this point) that the object of property, which I will refer to as the property or the asset, can also be an intangible thing, including a transferrable contractual right such as a right of payment against a bank. 38 Say C is the owner of property, which is invalidly transferred to D, that is to say it comes into the control or possession of D without a valid exercise of C's power of transfer as owner. 39 The natural way to understand the legal position is that C has a claim to recover the property because his right of ownership of the property is unaffected by the invalid transfer. In the sense suggested above, the claim to recover the property vindicates the primary right of ownership, i.e. it secures to C the benefit of his primary right. is surely just a matter of property law, as I think would be generally accepted, even if it may commonly take the conventional form of trespass or conversion. However, if it is to be understood in accordance with the pattern suggested earlier, the implication is that there is a doctrinal category of private property, with its own principle of liability, covering at least this type of claim, and some will find this less palatable. I will come back to this point below.
Say instead the property invalidly transferred is lost in a mixture or is incorporated into other property of D's. The standard analysis here is that the original right of ownership is lost, because the property -the object of the right -is lost, and instead, because of the invalidity of the transfer, C acquires a personal claim for restitution of the value of the transfer. It seems that this claim cannot be a matter of property law, since the right of ownership has been lost. In the case where the property is money, in some circumstances it is said that, although the transfer was invalid, title passes to D in order to protect the interest of third parties in being able to rely on the character of the property as money, and so again C has lost his right of ownership and can have no claim as a matter of property law. Again, since the transfer was invalid, there should be a personal claim for restitution of the transfer.
In these cases, it seems that, because the claim cannot be a matter of property law, it must be a claim in a distinct doctrinal category, which is understood to be unjust enrichment.
This brief account is not intended to do justice to the detail of the relevant law, merely to show why it is thought that these claims must be unjust enrichment claims. But is there really a distinct basis for an unjust enrichment claim outside property law, and if so what is the nature of the injustice and the principle of liability? This is not at all clear. As discussed above, the standard approach to unjust enrichment does not explicitly identify a principle of liability. It merely points to an unjust factor that triggers an unjust enrichment claim in particular circumstances. In this type of situation, the unjust factor is said to be a vitiating factor such as mistake, or lack of authority for the transfer, where the transfer is made by arisen, viz, the invalidity of the transfer. The problem is, if the primary right was a right of ownership of the original property transferred, how it can be vindicated otherwise than by the recovery of the original property. The answer is that one can treat the transfer of property, though it was in the form of a tangible thing or other specific asset, as a transfer of wealth, which contributes wealth to D's estate. The property transferred is treated as wealth in just the way that a bankrupt's estate or a deceased's estate is treated as wealth, the tangible things and specific assets that make it up being treated simply as embodiments of exchangeable or realisable value. The specific asset transferred enters D's estate, and C cannot assert ownership of it, but he has a claim to the wealth transferred, and this vindicates the primary right of ownership in the sense explained above, that is to say it secures to C, in the way that is appropriate in the circumstances, the benefit of his right under the primary relation. Thus the claim is a matter of property law, i.e. a property-based claim.
A claim to recover wealth or value is conventionally understood as a personal claim, meaning that the remedy is equivalent to a debt for the value of the transfer. This is how the common law claim for restitution is understood, for example the claim to recover a mistaken payment. The contrast is with what is conventionally described as a proprietary claim, usually understood as a claim of ownership of a specific asset, which is capable of being extracted from D's estate and returned to C. For many commentators, it is because the claim is personal in this sense that it must be an unjust enrichment claim rather than a matter of property law.
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But even if it is right that the claim to recover a mistaken payment should be a personal claim because it is a claim to recover wealth rather than a specific asset, it is nevertheless in my view a property-based claim in the sense that it arises to vindicate a primary right of ownership. In any case, the remedy is not in principle equivalent to debt or damages. It is in principle a claim to a defined part of D's estate, though not necessarily a specific asset. This 43 e.g., Weinrib, supra note 1.
is that part of D's estate, considered as a body of wealth, that would not have been there in the absence of the transfer, that is to say it is the "surviving value" of the transfer. A claim to this part of the estate is capable of binding indirect recipients, including creditors; indeed in principle it ought to, because one can identify a transfer of surviving value, defined in this way, to an indirect recipient, and the indirect recipient should in principle be liable to surrender the surviving value just as a direct recipient is. 44 In addition, it is worth noting that the surviving value will often be the value of the original asset and so a claim in respect of surviving value can be satisfied by returning the asset. In fact, it is normally only when the asset is treated by D as wealth, rather than as a specific asset valuable as such, that the surviving value is liable to depart from the value of the specific asset in D's estate. It is only at this point that the claim has to be treated as a claim to the surviving value rather than to the specific asset.
Although the common law claim for restitution is not recognised as proprietary, it is increasingly being understood in a way that is consistent with this analysis. Whereas the traditional approach was to treat the claim as equivalent to a claim to recover a debt in the measure of the transfer, subject to reduction for change of position by way of a defence, it is increasingly common to think of change of position as going to reduce the measure of recovery, so that the claim is to recover D's continuing or surviving enrichment.
45 44 It might be said that a claim will arise against an indirect recipient only if the indirect recipient has received property belonging to the claimant, and not merely because there has been a transfer of value from the claimant to the indirect recipient according to a causation test. But of course this includes the case where the indirect recipient receives traceable proceeds of the original asset and as suggested below it is not clear that tracing can be justified in principle otherwise than as a way of determining surviving value. 45 See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 10, 248. There is another problem relating to the common law. One might say that if a transfer is invalid it is no transfer at all, or at least there is merely a transfer of possession or control that the law does not recognise as having any legal effect as a transfer. But in fact an invalid transfer from C to D can have legal effect in giving the recipient of the transfer D the power to dispose of the specific asset transferred in favour of third parties. At the same time C should retain the right to the value of the transfer as against third parties. Thus one might want to say that title has passed to D in one sense, relating to control of the asset, but retained by C in another sense, relating to the value of the transfer, or in other words that the adequate treatment of an invalid transfer calls for two concepts of title. Equity's more sophisticated treatment of invalid transfers results from the fact that it did develop two concepts of title -the former is how legal title should be understood, in my view, and the latter is how beneficial or equitable title should be understood.
The equivalent claim in equity is the equitable proprietary claim, which traditionally takes the form of a claim to recover a transfer of trust property that is invalid because it was made by a trustee or fiduciary acting beyond his powers. According to the conventional analysis, the fact that the claim is proprietary means not that the beneficiary C has a right to surviving value, but that he retains beneficial ownership of the specific asset transferred.
However, there is a longstanding problem affecting the equitable proprietary claim, namely how to explain the law of tracing. Although the equitable proprietary claim is understood to be a claim of beneficial ownership of the specific asset transferred, if this asset is exchanged for some other asset, C's proprietary claim is, as it were, transmitted to the new asset, the exchange property. The rationale for this is controversial. The remedy should vindicate the primary right, and if the primary right was a right of beneficial ownership of the original asset, how can it be vindicated by transmitting it to a different asset? The principle of unjust enrichment is sometimes taken to explain this, that is to say the claim to the exchange property is said to arise to prevent D's unjust enrichment. 46 But, again, this seems to me unsatisfactory because it does not identify a distinct principle of liability, or explain how the principle relates to the primary right of ownership. 47 It seems to me that the most plausible if not the only plausible rationale for the tracing rules is that fundamentally the claim is to surviving value, which the tracing rules serve to identify. The tracing rules take the form of identifying specific assets, and the claim is conceived as jumping from asset to asset because of the mistaken assumption that the proprietary claim must take the form of a claim in respect of a specific asset.
The suggested approach is that the claim for restitution of an invalid transfer of property (which includes the common law claim for restitution and the equitable proprietary tracing claim) is always a remedial right arising to vindicate the primary right of ownership, and so is always a matter of property law, though it is a claim for surviving value and not necessarily a claim to recover the original asset transferred. This approach provides a possible account of the law, though it would call for some changes to the current rules, and it is an attractive account in my view because it optimises the protection for the owner whilst also respecting the rights of the recipient and third parties, who are not prejudiced if the claim is limited to surviving value. 49 The alternative, which I have argued is mistaken, is to insist that property law is limited to providing a claim to the original asset, and that any further claim must be based on a distinct principle of unjust enrichment. This is equivalent to the position referred to above with respect to contract, where the principle of unjust enrichment is invoked to explain claims that arise out of the non-performance of a contract but cannot be explained as contractual claims under the standard analysis of contract. Again, in my view, the unjust enrichment approach involves the remedy-as-justification fallacy. From the starting point that a claim for restitution is justified, and on the assumption that it is inexplicable as a claim based on the original right of ownership, it is inferred that there must be a principle of unjust enrichment to account for it. This has the effect of obscuring the real issue, which is what remedy is appropriate in the circumstances to vindicate the original right of ownership.
Most accounts of property and unjust enrichment argue in favour of (or simply assume) what I have denied above, that there is a genuine distinction, based in principle, between the claim that arises as a matter of property law by virtue of the invalidity of a transfer, and the unjust enrichment claim that arises where the transfer was valid as a matter of property law but was nevertheless in some other way defective. Weinrib has the following account of the distinction. 50 He takes the position rejected above, that property law ceases to be relevant if the claim is not to recover the specific asset transferred, because the primary right of ownership of the asset has been extinguished. Since the claim is not based on ownership, it must lie in the relationship between the parties, arising from the particular interaction between them. More particularly, according to Weinrib, the claim arises from two "obligation-creating conditions", the fact that C's intention to make the payment was vitiated, and the fact that D accepted the payment when he knew this was the case or in circumstances in which he should be taken to have accepted the risk that it was the case. These circumstances justify a personal rather than a proprietary claim and a corresponding liability as between C and D.
However, the claim for restitution surely arises because and insofar as D is in surplus as a result of his receipt of the invalid transfer -insofar as he is enriched by it -and this does not in principle depend on whether D knew or is deemed to have known that the transfer was invalid. 51 This is how the claim is understood in the case law and literature, whether it is understood as a property-based claim or as an unjust enrichment claim. There is another type of claim that should in principle depend on actual or deemed knowledge of the invalidity of the transfer, which should be distinguished from the restitutionary claim. If D has received an invalid transfer, and he knows or ought to know of the invalidity, he should incur a duty not to consume or dispose of what he has received, for breach of which duty he should be liable to compensate C for any resulting loss. This claim of C's should in principle be a personal 50 Weinrib, supra note 1. For another account of the distinction, see Nadler, supra note 14. 51 A point made by Zoe Sinel, "Through Thick and Thin: The Place of Corrective Justice in Unjust Enrichment" (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 551 at 557. According to Weinrib, supra note 1, the claim cannot be understood as a claim in respect of the wealth as a thing, as if it were a matter of property, because this would not explain the fact that the law has different tests of validity for transfers depending on whether the claim is a matter of property or unjust enrichment, nor would it explain the requirement for acceptance of the transfer by the recipient. But the problem is surely to explain why there is a difference insofar as this is the case; and on my understanding there is not generally any requirement of acceptance. although it is only partly manifested in the case law, in principle the protection of property owners in respect of invalid transfers involves these two types of claim, the claim for restitution to recover the surviving value of the transfer, and the claim for compensation for loss caused by a breach of the duty of a recipient to preserve or not to consume or dispose of property received through an invalid transfer.
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The "duty of exclusion" conception of private property
Finally, I will touch briefly on two general aspects of private property that might be thought problematic for the approach I have suggested above. The first of these relates to the common assumption that a right of ownership should be understood as a right correlated with a duty not to enter or encroach on or misappropriate or dispose of property, a "duty of exclusion".
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It presumably follows from this assumption that a claim to vindicate a right of ownership is a claim arising from a breach of such a duty. However, as I have just pointed out, a claim for restitution of an invalid transfer is normally understood to arise from the receipt of the invalid transfer and the subsistence in D's estate of surviving value, and this surely does not in itself constitute a breach of duty by D, since it was beyond his control. The claim for restitution of the transfer has to be distinguished from the claim that arises from the breach of a duty not to 52 At common law, tort law in the form of trespass or conversion combines these two distinct roles, sometimes leading to injustice. enter or encroach on or misappropriate property. This might be understood to imply that the claim for restitution of the transfer is not a remedial right arising to vindicate the primary right of ownership, and this may be why it is widely thought that the claim for restitution does not arise to vindicate any pre-existing right at all, and that instead the claim is itself a primary right. It seems that this is how the claim is understood by commentators who regard it as an unjust enrichment claim rather than a property-based claim. 54 This position makes no sense to me: a claim arises to correct an injustice, and the injustice must be defined relative to an antecedent primary relation.
It is true that generally there is a duty of exclusion with respect to another person's property, but, although this is a crucial part of a sound regime for the protection of property, it is not the correlate of the right of ownership, and it should not be understood as definitional of the right of ownership. The right of ownership is, more fundamentally, a right to all the benefit of the property: it represents an allocation to the owner of the benefit of the object of property, including prospective or contingent benefit, so that anyone who receives the property incurs a liability to return it or its value, simply by virtue of the receipt, and not by virtue of any wrong. Thus it is an example of the alternative pattern of liability identified above. On this approach, the claim for restitution of an invalid transfer can indeed be understood as vindicating the primary right of ownership.
55
This approach has the advantage that it obviates the need to rely on the elusive principle of unjust enrichment.
There are other reasons for preferring this as the more basic account of the right of ownership. First, the content of the duty of exclusion should or could reasonably depend on 54 See S Smith, supra note 18. 55 It is sometimes said that a claim should be characterised by reference to the "causative event" that triggers it, and the causative event cannot be a matter of property law because "property is not an event": the event that generates the claim is the invalid transfer, which is, or causes, an unjust enrichment. As it is also put, "property is a kind of right, while unjust enrichment is a source of rights": Chambers, supra note 10, 264, following Birks. But the issue is how to characterise the causative event. A causative event generates a claim by virtue of a primary relation -the legal relation subsisting before the claim arises, and by virtue of which the event has its legal effect -and it is by reference to this relation -the right of ownership -that it should be characterised. feature of the duty of exclusion in these cases distinguishes them, but because the more fundamental right to the benefit of an object of property is absent in these cases.
The principle of liability behind private property claims
The second general theoretical concern is that the suggested approach mischaracterises property in a more fundamental way. The approach suggested above implies that there is a doctrinal category of private property, comparable to contract or negligence, consisting of property-based claims based on a common principle of liability. But is there any such principle of liability? One might think that property law is too complex to be understood in this way. In my view, there is such a principle and it should be understood along the following lines.
56 Also, it would be possible in principle to have a case where other parties are free to enter the property but in doing so incur a liability to pay for the unauthorised use.
The significance of private property is that one can invest labour and resources in an object of property, acquiring it, creating it, improving it, maintaining it, or holding it, with a view to receiving the resulting benefit. The principle that the law of private property gives effect to is that someone who has made such an investment of labour or resources in an object of property should receive the resulting benefit ahead of others. The principle protects the interest of someone who has acted on the assumption that he will receive this benefit. Any thing that persists in a well-defined form through time, so that one can link the benefit to be This approach differentiates objects of property from other sorts of interest or benefit that attract legal protection in other ways. For example, it seems to me that a trade secret should be understood as an object of property because the rationale for protection is to give the owner the benefit of his work in creating it, whereas private information should not be understood as an object of property because the rationale for a right in respect of private information is only to avoid harm through its misuse and not to secure to the right-holder the benefit to be gained from the use of the information. 59 In consequence, in the case of a trade secret, but not private information, there should be a claim for payment for unauthorised use of the information as an object of property, and it should be possible to transfer or licence its use as an object of property. Similarly, the law of defamation does not protect reputation as an object of property, unlike celebrity or personality rights, which (if and when they are recognised in the law) are designed to secure to the claimant the commercial value of his reputation and therefore allow for the licensing of name and image as an object of property.
Money and investments in the form of transferable contractual rights to payment are also objects of property. The contractual right, which binds only other contracting parties, can itself be an object of property, and a right of ownership over it can bind other parties, and this is the basis for the recovery of the contractual right or its value if it is invalidly transferred to a third party. In these cases, it is not the presence of a duty not to cause harm or not to interfere or encroach that identifies the right of ownership but the right to the benefit of an object of property.
58 Usually described as a claim for restitutionary damages or licence fee damages. See further Peter Jaffey, "Licence Fee Damages" [2011] Restitution Law Review 95. 59 Thus the recent division in the old law of confidentiality, supra note 7, is justified.
Labour, or the interest in having control over one's labour, is not an object of property, and the provision of services is not a transfer of an object of property. A claim for payment for the provision of services is not a claim for the return of property or wealth transferred. The theory of unjust enrichment typically treats the provision of services as equivalent to a transfer of property, which amounts to treating labour as an object of property.
As mentioned above, the principle of unjust enrichment is often expressed as the principle that unjust enrichments should be reversed. 60 This seems similar to saying that invalid transfers of property should be reversed, which is an expression of the requirement of vindication as discussed above, the requirement that where there has been an invalid transfer the primary right of ownership over the property should be vindicated by way of a claim to recover the property. The principle that an unjust enrichment should be reversed appears to extend this to the provision of services as well. The appeal of the principle arises from its being presented and understood as if all unjust enrichments were equivalent to invalid transfers of property, but with respect to the provision of services there is no transfer to be reversed because there is no object of property to be recovered. The issue is whether there should be a right to payment in exchange for the benefit conferred, which is a different matter entirely. It is a persistent error in the unjust enrichment literature to equate these different types of case.
The private property principle of liability as stated above is familiar in various guises, and has been put forward as a version of the principle of unjust enrichment, particularly in connection with the unauthorised use of intangible things. For example, say C has produced a valuable new idea in his business, or has compiled useful commercial information, or has developed a reputation that can be exploited commercially by licensing, and D uses the idea 60 Supra note 18.
gist of C's complaint is not that D has caused a loss to C, 62 but that he has made a profit through the use of a valuable thing that C created, diverting to himself benefit that C should be entitled to as the person whose work created the benefit or the opportunity for benefit.
This type of claim has long been controversial. It is sometimes expressed as a claim for misappropriation or unfair competition, but also as a claim in unjust enrichment, on the basis that D is unjustly enriched at C's expense if C is denied a claim. 63 Where such a claim is allowed, however, it depends on accepting that the valuable intangible in question is recognised in law as an object of property, and that D has used it without authorisation. The issues concern property and its vindication and, once these issues have been resolved, there is no other substantive question left to address and no room for a principle of unjust enrichment to operate. This type of case involves a claim arising from the unauthorised use of property, but the point is equally true with respect to invalid transfers, as discussed above. In general, the concept of unjust enrichment has nothing to offer to the treatment of property-based claims.
CONCLUSIONS
The recognition of a new doctrinal category of unjust enrichment is not simply a matter of presentation or labelling. It affects the development of the law through the role of doctrinal categories in legal reasoning. A doctrinal category is sound if it is based on a genuine principle of liability, and it is very difficult to accept that there is a general principle of unjust enrichment to support such a category. The appeal of a category of unjust enrichment lies more in the fact that, in areas like contract and property, it seems impossible, in the light of the conventional understanding of these areas, to account for claims for a restitutionary remedy as claims arising as a matter of contract law or property law, that is to say, as claims arising to vindicate primary rights in contract or property. But the claims for a restitutionary remedy that arise out of a contract or from transfers of property can be explained in terms of contract and property, without the need for the supposed principle of unjust enrichment. This emerges from an exploration of the nature of the principles of liability that support these categories.
There are persistent problems in the areas of law discussed above -for example, when should a contracting party be entitled to recover a prepayment, what should the tracing rules be, or when should a claim to recover a mistaken payment or some other invalid transfer be proprietary -for which one might expect the theory of unjust enrichment to offer solutions. But if my approach is right, although the category of unjust enrichment is becoming well established, it is destined not to solve these or any other problems, or more generally to promote the development of the law for the better, but instead, like its predecessor the theory of quasi-contract, to obscure the real issues at stake and obstruct the sound development of the law.
